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Introduction 
 
The directly elected executive mayor has been with us in England for more than a decade. Drawing 
inspiration from European and American experience (see Elcock and Fenwick, 2007) the elected 
mayor has appealed to both Labour and Conservative commentators in offering a solution to 
perceived problems of local leadership. For the Left, it offered a reinvigoration of local democracy, 
a champion for the locality who could stand up for the community: in one early pamphlet, a Labour 
councillor envisaged that an elected mayor could “...usher in a genuinely inclusive way of doing 
civic business as well as giving birth to an institution that encourages and values people” (Todd, 
2000: 25). For the Right, it offered the opportunity to cut through the lengthy processes of local 
democratic institutions by providing streamlined high-profile leadership.  Although inconsistent in 
their expectations of what the new role of executive mayor would bring, Left and Right shared a 
view that leadership of local areas was failing. Despite the very low turnout in referendums on 
whether to adopt the system, and the very small number of local areas that have done so, the 
prospect of more executive mayors, with enhanced powers, refuses to exit the policy arena. 
 
During 2012, the coalition government initiated mayoral referendums in England’s ten largest cities. 
In only one case was there a public vote in favour of establishing a directly-elected executive 
mayor. However, sensing the local political opportunity, two cities – initially Leicester, then 
Liverpool – had pre-empted the referendum process by adopting the mayoral system by resolution 
of the council. Salford, following a different path, held a referendum initiated by public petition in 
January 2012, and also opted for the elected mayor model. Clearly, in policy terms, something is 
still going on. But what? This paper draws from a decade of research, completed by recent 
interviews with some of the newest mayors, to consider:  
 
 Reasons for the persistence of the mayoral experiment, despite no evidence of any 
significant public support for this model of local governance 
 An analysis of the political and managerial leadership represented by the directly elected 
mayor  
 The unresolved relationship between the elected mayor and local place   
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Historical Context: the Search for Local Leadership within a Core Executive 
 
Importing directly-elected executive mayors into local government in England, and potentially in 
Wales, is but one example of the long-standing search for an effective core executive in local 
councils: one that is capable of addressing the perceived failures of the old committee system 
including poor co-ordination, duplication of services, lengthy decision-making and wasted money 
and time (Elcock, 1996). The mayoral agenda has also been based on the implicit assumption that 
local authorities needed a clearly identifiable figurehead to engage with other actors involved in an 
increasingly ‘hollowed out” (Rhodes, 1995) local governance. The search for viable core leadership 
can be traced back to the 1960s, with the Maud Committee's recommendation that local authorities 
should be governed by a Board of between 5 and 9 members (Maud Committee, 1967). This did not 
come to pass, but some councils did experiment with new management structures, including 
Newcastle City Council's appointment of a City Manager (Elliott, 1971; Foote-Wood, 2010) and 
Leeds City Council's appointment of a “troika” of three officers (the Clerk, the Treasurer and the 
City Engineer) to co-ordinate both policy and service provision. In the 1970s, the Bains Report 
(1972) proposed that a Policy and Resources Committee at political level should be formed to co-
ordinate policy and service provision, while, at officer level, a Chief Executive Officer should lead 
a management team of departmental chief officers. Most of the new English local authorities 
formed in 1973 followed some or all of these recommendations. In the early 1990s, Michael 
Heseltine commissioned two reviews of English local government. The first reviewed its structure 
and led to the formation of the Local Government Commission for England which carried out an 
incremental, sometimes radical, reorganisation of the structure (Leach, 1998); see also Fenwick and 
Bailey (1998a, 1998b, 1999). The second was a working party on the internal management of local 
authorities, reporting initially in 1991 (DoE, 1991). Heseltine declared his enthusiasm for directly 
elected mayors in providing clear identifiable accountability and leadership. He also believed that 
the process of electing mayors would engage local voters and reverse the pattern of declining local 
turnout. Such interest generated, and to some extent was generated by, a growth of academic 
discussion of elected mayors overseas and how they might be instituted in England and Wales 
(Stoker and Wolman, 1992; Borraz et al., 1994; Elcock, 1995). Yet a persistent finding of research is 
that elected mayors do not increase voters' interest (Copus, 2006). Turnouts in American local 
elections where elected mayors existed have been as poor or lower than those in Britain.   
 
Meanwhile, although a further working party report published in July 1993 did not directly 
advocate elected mayors it did make further proposals for the creation of core executives in local 
government. In general, it recommended the creation of a formal distinction between executive 
councillors responsible for policy-making and other councillors who would be community 
representatives, concentrating on scrutinising the executive. By the end of the 1990s such a 
distinction was informally accepted by many councillors (Elcock, 1998). This working party 
proposed four innovations: first, the establishment of a single party executive committee, exempt 
from the requirement imposed after the Widdicombe Report (1986) to appoint members to all 
decision-making committees in proportion to their parties' strengths on the full council; secondly, 
lead members to be chosen to whom the council would delegate executive powers; thirdly, a cabinet 
system to be created, with delegated powers to its members; and, lastly, a distinct political 
executive, possibly elected separately, opening the door to the prospect of a directly elected mayor 
in control of policy, with the council becoming largely a scrutinising and review body (DoE, 1993; 
Leach and Wilson, 2000).  
 
Following the election of May 1997, further debate on the future prospects for elected executive 
mayors was subsumed within the discourse of New Labour ‘modernisation’ as a whole. The 
mayoral agenda connected strongly to several areas of modernisation: public participation, effective 
leadership, ‘performance’ and a modernist notion of rational progressive change. Mayors were of  
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the time. They were, after all, new. Legislation to create an elected Mayor for London, together with 
a Greater London Assembly was passed after a referendum in May 1998. Thus the UK's first elected 
mayor was established. Then the publication of White Papers on local government leadership 
(DETR, 1998, 1999) generated the Local Government Act 2000 which offered local authorities and 
their communities three options for reforming local political management structures. These were an 
elected mayor with a cabinet; an elected mayor with a city manager, or a leader and cabinet system 
(smaller authorities with populations of less than 75,000 were permitted if they wished to retain the 
traditional committee system). The Government emphasised the value of such executive systems in 
improving the management and co-ordination of the council's services, providing a clear point of 
contact for the numerous organisations now involved in the wider governance of fragmented local 
government systems and increasing public interest and involvement in local political life. 
 
The first elected executive mayors took office in 2002, but only in a very small number of local 
councils: eleven in total (excluding the London mayor) at the outset. Where mayors came into 
being, it tended to be in response to a crisis in the affairs of the council, such as the imprisonment of 
its leading members for corruption (Doncaster), pressure from prominent local citizens for the 
creation of a mayor together with an especially high-profile contender (Middlesbrough - see 
Fenwick, Grieves and McMillan, 2004) or general disillusionment with the performance of long-
standing party systems (North Tyneside; Mansfield). Voting ‘yes’ in the initial referendums 
provided what was essentially a political opportunity for local people in very specific places, 
motivated by very specific reasons which had little to do with the great vision of local leadership 
offered by either Left or Right. The novel use of the supplementary vote system provided an 
additional opportunity for a few local parties to sense the prospect of power by a faster route than 
the long haul of increasing council seats a third at a time. Significantly, none of the initial crop of 
elected mayors was to be found in the big cities where both Left and Right had focussed their 
attentions and where the dramatic changes to city government were envisaged as taking place. Only 
one council, Stoke on Trent, opted for the mayor and council manager option (a fascinating sharing 
of executive authority between officer and elected leader) but Stoke subsequently reverted to the 
leader and cabinet model. The mayor and manager option was removed altogether from the statute 
book by the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. There is no evidence 
from either the referendums or the subsequent elections that public interest has been increased by 
the opportunity to vote for elected mayors.  
 
On the Right, Heseltine remained a confirmed enthusiast for elected mayors. He chaired a 
Conservative Party working party on local government which produced an important “Open 
Source” report (Conservative Party, 2009), including a recommendation that the largest English 
provincial cities should be required to hold referendums on whether to adopt elected mayors. This 
was itself a compromise given a persistent argument within such circles that elected mayors should 
be introduced to all English councils. After the Conservatives took office in coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats in May 2010, this plan was put into operation and, under the Localism Act 2011, 
referendums were duly held in ten cities in May 2012. 
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What Goes On? The Faltering Expansion of the Mayoral Experiment 2011-12   
 
"The whole point is to give people a say. No-one is forcing mayors on anyone." Grant Shapps, 
Conservative Minister, 2012   
 
The referendums held in 2012 were, in Prime Minister David Cameron’s words, “...not some trivial 
re-structure or fiddling about” – perish the thought that this could ever be the case in local 
government - but were a much more significant opportunity to “see your city grow more prominent, 
more powerful, more prosperous” (BBC News on-line 23 April 2012). An affirmative vote would be 
followed by mayoral elections in these cities later in 2012. Mayors would then enjoy the prospect of 
sitting in a twice-yearly mayoral Cabinet, chaired by Cameron, to share experience and lobby 
government directly on the needs of their cities.  
 
This vision did not come to pass. Turnout figures of around 24% in Manchester, Nottingham and 
Bristol, rising to 35% in Bradford, suggested, as in earlier mayoral referendums, that the public is at 
best lukewarm in expressing a view about this opportunity (Table 1). Of those citizens who did 
vote, in nine of the ten cities there was a clear decision not to introduce the mayoral system. Only in 
Bristol was there a ‘yes’ vote. Arguably, this was accounted for in part by specific local factors, as 
in earlier affirmative referendums elsewhere. Bristol City Council had experienced a relatively 
unstable leadership and a number of changes of leader in the previous decade, with a level of 
political uncertainty characterised by The Economist as “...coups, ambushes, partial elections and 
backroom deals bringing down minority administrations and wobbly, ad-hoc coalitions.” 
(‘Bagehot’, 2012). The case for a Bristol mayor has been advanced by, for instance, Sweeting 
(2012).  
 
 
Table 1: Mayoral Referendums 2012 
 
City  Yes %  No %  Turnout  
Birmingham 42.2 57.8 208,696 
Bradford 44.9 55.1 120,232 
Bristol 53.3 46.7 76,912 
Coventry 36.4 63.6 62,102 
Leeds 36.7 63.3 170,350 
Manchester 46.8 53.2 91,270 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne 38.1 61.9 64,719 
Nottingham 42.5 57.5 49,263 
Sheffield 35 65 127,461 
Wakefield 37.8 62.2 72,967 
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Under the 2007 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, it became possible to 
introduce the elected mayor system through resolution of the council: public consultation in some 
form is still needed, but there is no longer a requirement for a referendum. Leicester took this route 
in 2010. Liverpool followed the same procedure in 2012 and elected its first mayor in May of that 
year. Nonetheless, even now, only 16 local councils in England (excluding the London mayor) have 
mayoral systems (Table 2). In only 14 of these was the mayoral system introduced as a result of a 
popular vote.   
 
Yet there exist some indications that in the few places where mayors exist, there is no strong 
appetite to abolish the office and replace it with the council leader system commonplace elsewhere. 
In Doncaster, the referendum in May 2012 on whether to abolish the office of elected mayor, 
currently occupied by a member of the English Democrats who are politically unrepresented 
anywhere else, indicated that voters wished to retain the mayoral system by 62% to 38%. This could 
be seen as positive evidence that elected mayors may gain acceptance where they have had the 
chance to establish themselves and demonstrate their value, an argument plausibly at the disposal of 
those who favour expansion of the mayoral experiment. Yet it could also be evidence of the very 
same indifference that elsewhere leads local electors to decline mayoral systems in the first place: 
there tends to be a vote for staying with what exists already and no great desire to change it unless 
there have been significant localised issues or scandals. 
 
Interestingly enough, the English Democrats also presented the petition in Salford which prompted 
its own 2012 referendum on whether to establish the office of mayor. The local Labour Party was 
against. When the first mayoral election in Salford was held, Labour won with 51% of the votes (on 
the second round) while the English Democrats obtained 3.6%.                              .  
 
Further referendums may well take place in future, whether to establish mayoral systems or to 
abolish them. The Labour Party locally, along with other political groups, is seeking a referendum 
on abolition of the mayoral system in Hartlepool. The Independent incumbent (first elected in 2002 
after a policy seemingly based on not campaigning in any conventional sense) was re-elected in 
2005 and 2009 and achieved a strong showing in the World Mayors awards.     
 
Experience in Liverpool and Leicester suggests that choosing a mayor without referendum could 
become a significant political route in ensuring its advance, given the manifest reluctance of local 
electors to introduce the mayoral system through any kind of popular vote. Introducing mayors 
universally by decision of central government would be an even more decisive way of concluding 
the matter, and has, it seems, been considered by government. However it would be politically 
difficult to advance the mayoral agenda - predicated partly on public engagement - in quite this 
prescriptive way.  
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Table 2: Elected Mayors in England (at August 2012)     
 
Local Council   Mayor   Party  Last Election  
Bedford (Unitary)   Dave Hodgson  Liberal Democrat  2011  
Bristol (Unitary)  -   -  
Initial election due  
November 2012  
Doncaster (Metropolitan 
Borough)   
Peter Davies  English Democrats  2009 
Hackney (London Borough) Jules Pipe Labour 2010 
Hartlepool (Unitary)   Stuart Drummond  Independent  2009  
Leicester (Unitary)   Sir Peter Soulsby  Labour  2011  
Lewisham (London Borough)  Sir Steve Bullock  Labour  2010  
Liverpool (Metropolitan 
Borough) 
Joe Anderson  Labour  2012 
Mansfield (District)  Tony Egginton  Independent  2011  
Middlesbrough (Unitary)   Ray Mallon  Independent  2011  
Newham (London Borough) Sir Robin Wales Labour 2010 
North Tyneside (Metropolitan 
Borough)  
Linda Arkley  Conservative 2009 
Salford (Metropolitan Borough)   Ian Stewart Labour 2012 
Torbay (Unitary)   Gordon Oliver  Conservative  2011 
Tower Hamlets (London 
Borough) 
Lutfur Rahman Independent 2010 
Watford (District)  Dorothy Thornhill  Liberal Democrat  
2010  
 
 
Notes on Table 2:  
 
Stoke on Trent initially opted for an Elected Mayor (with Council Manager) system following a referendum in 2002. 
This was replaced by the Council Leader and Cabinet model following a further referendum in 2008.  
 
Table 2 does not include the London Mayor. Created under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, it is a different post 
with different powers.   
 
Bristol will hold its first mayoral election in November 2012 following its referendum in May 2012.    
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The Warwick Commission (2012) has considered the role of elected mayors in providing strategic 
leadership to cities. The Commission pointed to the inadequacies of a mayoral position that is 
limited to city council boundaries that do not correspond to areas with which the public identify, 
advocating instead a “Metro mayor” jurisdiction over a wide “functioning economic area” (2012: 
9). This argument is interesting in two respects. First, it resembles the view taken by some early 
political advocates of the mayoral system who envisaged a leadership role for mayors in the wider 
urban conurbation (eg, Todd, 2000) – what would become seen as the city region – rather than the 
existing municipality. This aspect of the mayoral debate is one that is likely to re-emerge in future, 
given the overall lack of success of the policy drive toward city mayors. Secondly, the emphasis 
upon Metro mayors (or indeed upon city mayors around existing municipal boundaries) is 
interesting in the context of the places where mayors actually exist (see Table 2). Until recently 
there were no elected mayors in any major cities at all, the public having opted for the system in 
relatively small and diverse local government areas.    
 
In policy terms, the uncertain advance of the elected mayor in 2012 has had some interesting 
subsidiary effects. The ‘City Deals’ agreed with eight cities in July 2012 (two months after the 
mayoral referendums) provide additional delegated powers, some transfer of budgets from central 
government, and greater powers to borrow. In return, the cities are now required to provide stronger 
governance, whether through instituting a directly elected mayor or, if not, through greater formal 
collaboration with other local councils. Two of the eight – Liverpool and Bristol - had already opted 
for mayors before the agreement on City Deals. All eight cities concerned were amongst the ten 
who held referendums in May 2012, apart from Liverpool which had already taken the decision 
without referendum. 
 
After more than a decade, in some important respects the mayoral system remains curiously 
unproven, for instance in the acrimonious dispute between the Conservative mayor of North 
Tyneside and its majority Labour council over respective powers to determine the annual budget, 
something that is not self-evidently clear from either statute or practice. There is still little sign of 
overall public enthusiasm for this faltering experiment in local leadership. Copus has noted that the 
elected mayor “failed to capture widespread public enthusiasm and interest” (2006: 42). Consistent 
with some initial expectations, or some initial fears, it has provided opportunities for independent 
candidates or those in minor parties to succeed (including Doncaster, Middlesbrough, Mansfield, 
Tower Hamlets and Hartlepool) but this co-exists rather uncomfortably with a highly persistent 
party-based local political culture that, going with the flow, tends toward or against elected mayors 
according to local political circumstance.  
 
 
 
 
What Sort of Leader, What Sort of Leadership?    
 
   I know no personal cause to spurn at him 
But for the general: he would be crown'd 
How that might change his nature: that's the question. 
(Julius Caesar, 2:1:11-13). 
 
Having outlined the context in which elected mayors found their way into English local government 
and having reviewed current developments and recent referendums, we now turn to the substantive 
question of what mayors are actually doing when in office. Are they leading locally? If so, what 
does it mean to speak of leadership in relation to elected mayors? To address these questions we 
turn to our own research, drawing from interviews conducted with elected mayors and applying the 
analytical matrix of leadership (Figure 1) we have previously proposed and applied in relation to 
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local decision-making (Elcock and Fenwick, 2012). This can be used to explore the experiences of 
elected mayors in communities ranging from a major city to a relatively small former mining 
community. The matrix contains nine cells, covering the governing, governance and allegiance roles 
of elected mayors and the formal, informal and personal attributes they possess and make use of in 
carrying out their roles.  
 
Governing  
 
The formal context of the elected mayor is set by the Local Government Act of 2000, which defines 
their powers and functions. This formal setting is in marked contrast with the earlier generation of 
relatively strong individual local authority leaders or “city bosses”, whose dominance of their 
councils depended largely on their personal attributes and local circumstances, together with party 
rules that permitted party leaders to control their councils, including recruitment to them, although 
their offices as leaders were not then given any form of statutory recognition (Jones and Norton, 
1978; Elcock, 1981, 2012). For today's elected mayors, however, the formal definitions and 
restriction of their powers, coupled with the development of the Overview and Scrutiny role for 
councillors who are not members of mayoral cabinets (and do not have executive authority) should 
provide protection from the misuses of powers with which some former “city bosses” were charged. 
Our respondents were generally supportive of the Overview and Scrutiny function as a means of 
holding them publicly to account for their actions and sought to ensure that it worked effectively in 
their authorities. One respondent declared that “good scrutiny is good governance” but like several 
other mayors, he wanted his Scrutiny Committees to be more proactive, not just reacting to his 
actions and policies. Thus another respondent declared that “I'm trying to get Scrutiny to understand 
policy development. I ask for a view about what we should do”. The formal accountability 
mechanism of Overview and Scrutiny maybe was strengthened by mayoral encouragement to play 
the role proactively. A third mayor identified effective leadership of Scrutiny Committees as being 
critical: his scrutiny function was performing better under a new chairman.  There was a general 
feeling that the Overview and Scrutiny role needed to be developed further by their councils. 
 
In terms of their governmental functions, elected mayors commonly claimed the benefits of quicker 
decision-making. One declared that “local decision-making is now much quicker – we took away 
the old slow local government”. A further perceived gain is better co-ordination of policies and 
service provision, although some mayors saw securing co-ordination as a continuing problem: “Co-
ordination is better but it's still pretty poor. There is too much of a departmental culture... (they) are 
not truly joined up. I have to bang on the table all the time!” Other mayors were more positive, 
however: one declared that “I engage across relationships (departments) rather than working in silos 
– work across the officers – counteract the silo mentality”. Another felt that the mayoral role had 
secured “better officer co-ordination – encourages officers to think outside the box.” A third 
declared that “everyone works well together here – there's no problem with co-ordination”. Mayors 
certainly recognised the besetting local government problem of cross-departmental co-ordination 
and were addressing it with varying degrees of success. 
 
Many mayors have determined their own policy priorities and initiated specific schemes. One 
mayor was concentrating on four policy areas: environment, regeneration, business and transport. 
Several mayors were engaged in personal projects, such as cleaning up their communities: one had 
developed “Operation Clean Streets” which entailed “concentrating on a different area each month. 
It makes an impact” to remove litter, graffiti and fly-tipping, while generally cleaning up the area. 
Others focussed on reducing crime and anti-social behaviour by appointing Community Safety 
Wardens to work closely with the police in local communities. Another initiative was the 
development of innovative new activities for young people. One interviewee demanded to know 
why no Community Service Orders were being made in his town and developed a close relationship 
with the Probation Service. Mayor Robin Wales's young people's musical initiative in Newham, an 
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attempt to imitate the highly successful Venezuelan El sistema programme, is particularly 
interesting. (We identify him here as he was not one of our respondents). One mayor had developed 
his policies by publishing a series of mayoral Green and White Papers outlining his proposed policy 
initiatives and seeking views on them from councillors, the public and outside groups: a White 
Paper means that the public can hold the Mayor and the Council to account. Another mayor had 
published a list of 100 pledges during his election campaign and claimed that 99 of them were met 
within his first 100 days as Mayor: “I need to demonstrate that I do an effective job – this must be 
demonstrated and documented”. A third mayor was implementing ambitious redevelopment plans 
for the town centre. 
 
The governmental role for executive mayors comprises the use of formal powers, internal 
relationships (particularly with senior officers) and the discharge of mayoral responsibilities. 
Governing involves not only formal powers however, it also includes informal relationships with 
senior actors within the local authority and it depends in no small part on the character and 
background of the mayor as an individual (see Figure 1). Even in formal terms, the governmental 
role of the mayor is not as settled as it might seem. As noted above, continuing dispute surrounds 
the respective powers of mayor and councillors in North Tyneside in relation to budget setting. 
Similarly, recent conflict between the elected mayor and councillors in Doncaster over local library 
provision and setting the annual budget had to be resolved at the level of judicial review. There is 
the prospect of a mayoral ‘abolition’ referendum in Hartlepool in 2012, partly arising from the 
mayor’s decision earlier in the year to dismiss the six Labour party members of his Cabinet. The six 
had approved the budget in Cabinet but then failed to attend full Council to confirm it. The mayor 
commented in the press that “they were all excellent councillors. It’s not personal and it’s not an 
anti-Labour thing” (Westcott, 2012). Elsewhere, one of our early interviewees, then in his first term, 
commented that he was going to identify all the powers that he could formally call upon, and was 
going to use them. Indeed there is continuing policy debate about investing all mayors with extra 
powers. This is likely to be an element of the mayoral agenda in the future, with central government 
seeking to make mayors a more attractive option by giving them more influence.  
 
Governance  
 
The mayors' extensive governance roles reflect the fragmentation and reconstruction of the local 
state, which mean that most local government policies require the involvement and collaboration of 
a wide range of other public authorities, as well as the local business community and voluntary 
sector, a process formalised for instance in the collaboration required as part of the ‘City Deal’ 
discussed above. In pulling together a wider pattern of partners in governance, mayors claimed real 
benefits in terms of securing coherent community action because they are clearly identifiable 
contact points for outside agencies. All the respondents spend much time and energy on maintaining 
and improving their contacts with numerous outside groups and organisations, notably the local 
business community and trades unions but also many other groups, including ethnic minorities, 
churches (one said that “the Bishop dropped in yesterday”) and environmental lobbies. Particular 
importance was attached to business contacts; one Labour mayor stressed his close personal 
relationships with the Chief Executive Officer of his local Chamber of Commerce: “we work 
together and politics are not there. He was very supportive of the concept of an elected mayor – 
more supportive than his colleagues”. Another respondent has a monthly breakfast with his local 
Chamber. One mayor in a multi-racial city attached importance to encouraging the teaching of 
English as a second language: the large Asian community “identify what we need to do”. Another 
mayor stressed the importance of the two Polish clubs in his town, an area of significant Polish 
settlement after the Second World War. Mayors also played active roles in their areas' Local 
Strategic Partnerships and more recently the new Local Enterprise Partnerships established by the 
Coalition Government, although none of our respondents had taken the chair of these bodies. The 
distinctive role of mayors in a partnership environment characterised by meta-bureaucracy rather 
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than co-governance (Fenwick, Johnston-Miller and McTavish, 2012) may indeed become important 
in defining the leadership role of that mayor in such meta-bureaucracy (see also Sims, 2012). One 
mayor within the present study was his LSP's Vice-Chairman and other mayors stressed the 
importance of these bodies. As indicated in Figure 1, the mayors’ role in wider patterns of local 
governance is partly a matter of formal partnerships but it is also a function of how individual and 
informal networks are employed.   
 
Allegiance  
 
The term allegiance in this context covers institutional and formal aspects of the mayor’s position 
(such as the prospect of referendums on abolishing the position), informal relationships (not least 
the relationship with the public) and individual characteristics (including integrity and personality) 
(see Elcock and Fenwick 2007; 2012). Crucially the variable of power runs through these elements 
of allegiance (Figure 1).    
 
The allegiance role has also produced significant innovations and changes in established local 
authority practice. Our respondents commonly stressed the importance of maintaining personal 
relations with the public, including dealing with individual requests and grievances: “I have to work 
on the micro level...because of telephone calls from members of the public...The people put us there 
and we must deliver what they want”. Some stressed their personal recognition, like the respondent 
who declared that “I cannot get 100 yards down the street without being stopped – this may be nice 
or not”. They also stressed their need to campaign for re-election from the beginning of their terms 
of office. Several stressed the usefulness of neighbourhood forums and parish councils as vehicles 
for maintaining public contact: one respondent declared that “the Neighbourhood Forums help – 
there is a lot of interest”. Many respondents stressed the importance of getting themselves and their 
cabinet members out into the local communities. “Cabinet members also go out and about in the 
community” and cabinet meetings were being held in different parts of the borough. They also 
attend meetings discussing local issues such as planning disputes, traveller sites or highway 
potholes. Most mayors also attached great importance to using the local media. Several mayors 
write weekly columns in their local newspapers or appear frequently in them; one claimed to be in 
his local newspaper two or three times a day.  Elected mayors have tended to have higher local and 
regional media profiles than their council leader counterparts in adjoining areas. Local broadcasters 
are important too, although one mayor reported having had persistent difficulties with his local 
BBC station.  
 
In carrying out these roles, mayors may be assisted or hindered by other factors. Relations with 
their councils and the party groups within them vary. The relationship may be one of co-operation, 
especially where the mayor and majority group are of the same party: one had a council where 52 of 
its 54 members were members of his party and he leads the majority Group himself. However, he 
denied that partisan politics was central to his role: “I came up with and am loyal to my Party but I 
have never been tribal...Politics is not the most important part of this job”. This sense of needing to 
be at least somewhat detached from partisanship was widely shared. Other mayors had more 
difficulty with majority council Groups drawn from their own party, however. One declared “having 
the same party in control is not necessarily easier. Labour members still have not comprehended 
their loss of executive control”. Others, especially Independent mayors or those faced with 
opposing majorities on their councils, had difficult, even confrontational relations with their 
councils, including having their budgets defeated by combinations of opposing parties. One 
Independent has had his budget rejected more than once. A Conservative Mayor faced with a 
Labour council majority had “managed to avoid gridlock” but had “imposed” decisions on them 
“when necessary”. Such conflicts were more likely where councillors had yet to recognise that their 
role had permanently changed following the election of an executive mayor. 
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Relationships with the Chief Executive and other senior officers also vary widely, ranging from 
close collaboration to outright dismissal (See Fenwick and Elcock, 2005). One called on his Chief 
Executive every Friday afternoon to wish him a nice weekend and was lucky to escape after one 
and a half hours. By contrast, several respondents had dismissed their Chief Executives or made 
them redundant. One mayor had made the Chief Executive redundant and had promoted the Chief 
Operating Officer to be Head of the Paid Service; he had also got rid of several other senior officers 
and reduced the size of the management team from seven to four. Another mayor had fired two 
Chief Executives and had redesignated the post as Managing Director with specific responsibility 
for service delivery. Hence, “we have stripped out the policy side of the CEO's work: strategic 
policies are made by the Mayor”. His view was that “the Mayor has to prevail over the Chief 
Executive – politicians must win every time”. He went on to say that “a lot of CEOs like to play the 
mayoral game as head of the organisation”. Significantly perhaps, his successor, drawn from a 
different political party, also had difficulties with his Chief Executive, claiming to have had four in 
three years but is now working well with his current Chief Executive. At least one mayor has 
defined the mayoral role as essentially including that of the CEO.    
 
The evidence of these interviews indicates that elected mayors are generally positive about their 
various roles and are keen to leave their impression on their councils and communities. They have 
demanded substantial changes in established practices but some have faced resistance from 
councillors and officers who have difficulty in accepting the changes in their roles imposed by the 
mayoral system. Governance roles are of great importance to our respondents. There have been no 
signs so far of problems of corruption or misuse of powers amongst the small crop of English 
mayors, despite Shakespeare's warning quoted at the beginning of this section. 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Mayors are still a policy innovation in England. They are new, and some of the difficulties of 
implementation can be ascribed to their novelty. Internationally, however, mayors are far from new. 
Historical lessons exist, and some of these lessons have a reach of more than a century. For 
instance, in the United States, the mayor-council model and the council manager model are 
overwhelmingly the most common, but not the only, options for local administration. The 
Commission model still exists. In Portland, Oregon, the city has uniquely retained the 
‘Commission’ form of local government. It adopted this system in 1913 after abandoning the 
mayoral form of government which existed from 1902 to 1913 (Morgan, Nishishiba and Vizzani 
2010).    
 
Moving forward a hundred years, the UK coalition government that took office in 2010 has 
continued with the expansion of the mayoral experiment, although (as under the previous 
government) this has had decidedly mixed results. If not a policy failure, it does represent 
something of a policy non-event which (as under the previous government) raises the question of 
why the mayoral agenda continues to be advanced by central government at all. It is clear from the 
level of participation in, and the results of, mayoral referendums and elections that public 
excitement is not overwhelming.   
 
Our interviews do reveal an individual leadership role of the mayor (Fenwick, Elcock and 
McMillan, 2006). Individual leadership is to be understood in a number of senses. First, it is distinct 
from party-based leadership, and it is evident that even where mayors belong to the majority party 
(or for that matter a minority party) they tend to see themselves as separate from some of the old 
ways of party discipline, possessed of a direct public mandate, and able to assert a certain 
independence. Secondly, it constitutes individual leadership in that it can, at best, serve to pull 
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together a number of local partners and interests, going beyond the boundaries of the council itself, 
as depicted in Figure 1. Thirdly, it is individual leadership insofar as it directly involves individual 
power as vested in the figure of mayor. Power is a significant common variable in the ‘analytical 
grid’ presented at Figure 1. It is also of interest to note the distinction that has been made between 
the ‘power’ and the ‘powers’ of the mayor. “The wider the powers, the greater the power” (Warwick 
Commission, 2012: 8). 
 
The persistence of the mayoral experiment resides in a consistent interest, across the main UK-wide 
parties, to ‘do something’ about the perceived inadequacies of leadership at local level. During the 
Conservative years, the attempt to do-something tended to run into the cul-de-sac of structural re-
organisation, as though revising local government structures would in itself generate different ways 
of working or eliminate annoying obstructions. During the New Labour years, the emphasis upon 
public engagement, as a key theme of local modernisation, manifested itself in new internal 
structures for local authorities – of which the elected mayor was a prominent option – and later by 
further organisational change, particularly in yet another attempt to address the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of two-tier and ‘unitary’ councils. All this remains unfinished business, and within 
this the faltering progress of the directly elected executive mayor continues. As it is now easier to 
create the post of elected mayor, with no requirement for a referendum, some further modest 
expansion of the mayoral model may well be envisaged according, as always, to local party political 
factors. The key choices facing central government in any acceleration of this unsteady growth of 
the executive mayor are likely to be, first, what kinds of extra powers are to be granted to elected 
mayors to make the job appear meaningful to local voters (or potential incumbents) and, secondly, 
what exactly should be the relationship of mayors to the place they represent and lead. On this latter 
point, there is a striking difference between ‘places’ and the artificial administrative areas that tend 
to characterise English local government (Table 2). This is a big and difficult issue for government 
given the competing interests involved.  
The meaning of place and locality remains uncertain in local public policy in England and it is a key 
challenge. There is an avowed emphasis in policy and legislation on localism, but there is tension 
between this push toward the most local level (sub local authority) and the wider economic area or 
urban region (extra local authority). Exactly where mayors can plausibly fit within the debates 
about meaningful local ‘belonging communities’ or regional economic units is unresolved, but any 
serious expansion of the mayoral agenda requires a resolution of this difficult question of place.  
Mayors are both political and managerial leaders. There is no doubt that this model of individual 
leadership was intended to break the accepted patterns of party dominance and dysfunctional 
decision-making at local level. The problem in adopting the mayoral mode from overseas however 
is partly one of prevailing political culture. In an English context, powerful individual leaders do 
not have a ready cultural acceptance. Although earlier episodes involving strong local leaders and 
‘City Bosses’ exist, as discussed in the opening sections of the present paper, they have tended not 
to end happily. There are Independents amongst the current fifteen (soon to be sixteen) mayors but 
they have to work with local party machines and with sitting councillors who may be political 
opponents. The result may be compromise and gridlock, rather than decisive local leadership.  
There are political, cultural and structural reasons for the uncertain advance of the elected mayor as 
local leader yet there remains a central government emphasis, across the parties, on its expansion. 
These tensions have not been addressed during the past decade. There appears to be no immediate 
prospect of resolving the strange case of the English mayor.   
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Methodology and Sources 
 
This paper draws from the authors’ research into local political leadership over the past decade. 
Between 2002 and 2005, a three-part study provided original data on changes in local political 
management, including the innovation of directly elected mayors. The initial study comprised a 
postal survey of councillors in four local authorities, follow-up interviews with a subsample of 
councillors, and interviews with four of the initial group of eleven directly elected mayors in 
England. Subsequently, two further mayors were interviewed. Additionally, one of the authors had 
conducted interviews with a sample of mayors in the USA and Germany and this was used to 
provide a comparison with early experience of this system in England. In 2012 three final 
interviews were conducted with serving mayors not previously included.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Analytical Grid for Elected Mayors 
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